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Abstract
We prove that every two-player non-zero-sum Borel game with lower-
semi-continuous payoffs admits a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium. This
result complements Example 3 in Solan and Vieille (2003), which shows
that a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium need not exists when the payoffs are
not lower-semi-continuous.
1 Introduction
Borel games are sequential games where two players alternately choose actions.
The payoff of each player is a function of the infinite sequence of actions that
the players chose. Borel games were introduced by Gale and Stuart (1953),
who studied zero-sum games where the payoff function is the indicator of some
set. In other words, player 1 wins if the play generated by the players is in a
given set of plays, and player 2 wins otherwise. Martin (1975) proved that if
the winning set of player 1 is Borel measurable, then the game is determined:
either player 1 has a winning strategy or player 2 has a winning strategy. This
result implies that every two-player zero-sum Borel game has a value, provided
the payoff function is bounded and measurable.
Mertens and Neyman (see Mertens, 1987) used the existence of the value
in multi-player non-zero-sum Borel games to prove that for every ε > 0, every
multi-player non-zero-sum Borel game has an ε-equilibrium, provided the payoff
functions are bounded and measurable. The ε-equilibrium strategies constructed
by Mertens and Neyman are as follows: each player i starts by following an ε2 -
optimal strategy in an auxiliary two-player zero-sum game Gi, where the payoff
is that of player i, player i is the maximizer and the other players try to minimize
player i’s payoff. This goes on as long as no player deviates. Once some player,
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say player i, deviates, the other players switch to an ε2 -optimal strategy of the
minimizers in the game Gi.
Thus, the players start by generating a play that yields all of them a high
payoff, and, if a player deviates, he is punished with a low payoff. This construc-
tion has the disadvantage that in the punishment phase, the punishers may lower
their own payoffs. Therefore, in real-life situations, players may be reluctant to
follow the equilibrium strategies constructed by Mertens and Neyman.
To deal with such non-credible threats of punishment, Selten (1965, 1973)
introduced the concept of subgame-perfect equilibrium. A strategy vector is a
subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium if it induces an ε-equilibrium after any possible
finite history of actions. Ummels (2005) proved the existence of a subgame-
perfect equilibrium when the payoff function of each player is the indicator of
some set. His proof is based on the following recursive construction. First, one
identifies all finite histories which are a winning position to either player 1 or
player 2; that is, if this finite history occurs, one of the players can ensure that
his payoff is 1. After each such finite history one instruct the winning player
to play his winning strategy, and the other player is instructed to play his best
response. One then identifies winning positions to the two players in the new
game, assuming the behavior in the first set of winning positions is set. The
process repeats itself, until it reaches a stable state. Ummels (2005) proves that
the pair of strategies thus defined is a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
In the present paper we show that every Borel game with bounded and lower-
semi-continuous payoffs admits a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0.
This result complements Example 3 in Solan and Vieille (2003) that shows that
in games with general payoff functions a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium need
not exist.
The determinacy of Borel games has attracted a lot of attention in descriptive
set theory (see, e.g., Schilling and Vaught (1983) and Kechris (1995)). A rich
literature identifies winning positions for the two players in the class of games
that are played on graphs (see Gra¨del (2004) for a survey). Two-player zero-
sum Borel games where used in the computer science literature to study reactive
non-terminating programs (see, e.g., Thomas (2002)) and model checking in µ-
calculus (see, e.g., Emerson et al. (2001)), and in economics to show that
measurable tests are manipulable (Shmaya, 2008).
Our result also relates to the game theoretic literature that studies the exis-
tence of a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium in various classes of infinite games, see,
e.g., Solan and Vieille (2003), Mashiah-Yaakovi (2009) or Flesch et al. (2008,
2009). In particular, our result generalizes results in Flesch et al. (2008, 2009).
The paper is organized as follows. The model and the main result appear
in Section 2. Section 3 contains the proof of the main result, and Section 4
contains some comments.
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2 The Model and the Main Result
Definition 1. A (two-player non-zero-sum) Borel game is a triplet (A, u1, u2)
where A is a set of actions, and u1, u2 : AN → R are payoff functions.
The game is played as follows. At every odd stage t player 1 chooses an
action at ∈ A, and at every even stage t player 2 chooses an action at ∈ A.
While making his choice at stage t, the player knows the sequence (aj)j<t of
actions that was chosen by the players in previous stages. The payoff to each
player i is ui(a1, a2, . . .). The description of the game is common knowledge
among the players.
Comment 2. The assumptions that (1) there are only two players, (2) both
players have the same action set, and (3) the set of action is the same in all
stages, are made for simplicity of notations only. Nothing that is said below
would be affected if there are more than two players, if the players have different
action sets, or if the sets of actions depend on past choices of actions.
Denote by ∅ the empty history at the beginning of the game. The set of
possible histories1 at stage t is Ht = A
t−1. Denote by H1 =
⋃
k∈NH2k−1 and
H2 =
⋃
k∈NH2k the sets of possible histories at decision points of player 1 and
player 2 respectively.
Definition 3. A strategy for player i is a function σi : Hi → A.
We denote by Σi the strategy space of player i. Every pair of strategies
(σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ1 × Σ2 determines a unique play p = p(σ1, σ2) = (at)t∈N ∈ AN as
follows:
a1 = σ
1(∅), (1)
a2k = σ
2(a1, a2, . . . , a2k−1), ∀k ∈ N, (2)
a2k+1 = σ
1(a1, a2, . . . , a2k), ∀k ∈ N. (3)
We denote by ui(σ1, σ2) = ui(p(σ1, σ2)) the payoff of player i when the two
players follow (σ1, σ2).
Definition 4. Let ε ≥ 0. A pair of strategies (σ1∗ , σ
2
∗) is an ε-equilibrium if
u1(σ1∗ , σ
2
∗) ≥ u
1(σ1, σ2∗)− ε, ∀σ
1 ∈ Σ1, (4)
u2(σ1∗ , σ
2
∗) ≥ u
2(σ1∗ , σ
2)− ε, ∀σ2 ∈ Σ2. (5)
Throughout the paper we endow A with the discrete topology, and AN with
the product topology.
The game is called zero-sum if u1(p) + u2(p) = 0 for every p ∈ AN. The
result of Martin (1975) implies that in zero-sum games, an ε-equilibrium exists
for every ε > 0 under merely a measurability condition.
1By convention, A0 = {∅} contains only the empty history.
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Theorem 5. If the game is zero-sum, and if u1 is bounded and Borel measur-
able, then an ε-equilibrium exists for every ε > 0.
This results implies the existence of an ε-equilibrium in every two-player
non-zero-sum game.
Theorem 6 (Mertens, 1987). If u1 and u2 are bounded and Borel measurable,
then an ε-equilibrium exists for every ε > 0.
A stronger notion of equilibrium is the notion of subgame-perfect equilib-
rium. Every finite history h = (a1, a2, . . . , al) ∈ H1∪H2, together with a pair of
strategies (σ1, σ2), determines an infinite play p = p(σ1, σ2 | h) = (bt)t∈N ∈ AN
as follows:
bj = aj , 1 ≤ j ≤ l, (6)
b2j = σ
2(b1, b2, . . . , b2j−1), l < 2j, (7)
b2j+1 = σ
1(b1, b2, . . . , b2j), l < 2j + 1. (8)
We denote by ui(σ1, σ2 | h) = ui(p(σ1, σ2 | h)) the payoff of player i at this
play.
Definition 7. Let ε ≥ 0. A pair of strategies (σ1∗ , σ
2
∗) is a subgame-perfect
ε-equilibrium if for every finite history h ∈ H1 ∪H2 one has:
u1(σ1∗ , σ
2
∗ | h) ≥ u
1(σ1, σ2∗ | h)− ε, ∀σ
1 ∈ Σ1, (9)
u2(σ1∗ , σ
2
∗ | h) ≥ u
2(σ1∗ , σ
2 | h)− ε, ∀σ2 ∈ Σ2. (10)
Thus, every finite history h defines a subgame — the subgame that starts
once the finite history h occurs. A strategy pair is a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium
if it induces an ε-equilibrium in all subgames.
We say that a finite history h = (at)
l
t=1 is a prefix of the play p = (bt)t∈N ∈
AN, or that p is an extension of h, if at = bt for every t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l}, and we
denote it by h ≺ p. We say that a finite history h = (at)lt=1 is a prefix of the
finite history h′ = (bt)
m
t=1 ∈ A
N, or that h′ is an extension of h, if l ≤ m and
at = bt for every t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l}, and we denote it by h  h′.
When A is endowed with the discrete topology, and AN is endowed with the
product topology, then a sequence (pk)k∈N of plays converges to a limit p if and
only if every prefix h of p is a prefix of all the plays (pk)k∈N except possibly of
finitely many of them.
Definition 8. The payoff function ui is lower-semi-continuous if for every se-
quence (pk)k∈N of infinite plays in H
1 ∪ H2 that converges to a limit p one
has
lim inf
k→∞
ui(pk) ≥ ui(p).
Note that every lower-semi-continuous function is Borel measurable. Our
main result is the following.
Theorem 9. If u1 and u2 are lower-semi-continuous and bounded, then the
game admits a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium for every ε > 0.
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3 Proof
We first note that if one changes the payoffs u1 and u2 by at most ε (in the
supremum norm), then every subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium in the original game
is a subgame-perfect 3ε-equilibrium in the new game. Because the range of the
payoff functions is bounded, we can assume w.l.o.g. that the range of u1 and
u2 is in fact finite. We will show that if the payoff functions are bounded and
have finite range, there is a subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium.
For i ∈ {1, 2} we denote by −i the player who is not i. We denote by i(h)
the player who has to choose an action after the history h; i(h) = 1 if h has
even length, and i(h) = 2 otherwise. We denote by −i(h) the player who is not
i(h).
3.1 Subgame-perfect optimal strategies
Definition 10. Let h ∈ H1 ∪ H2 be a finite history. The real number v(h) is
called the value at h if
v(h) = max
σi(h)∈Σi(h)
min
σ−i(h)∈Σ−i(h)
ui(h)(σ1, σ2 | h) = min
σ−i(h)∈Σ−i(h)
max
σi(h)∈Σi(h)
ui(h)(σ1, σ2 | h).
(11)
Because the range of the functions u1 and u2 is finite, the maximum and
minimum in (11) are well defined.
Definition 11. A strategy σi∗ ∈ Σ
i of player i is called subgame-perfect optimal
if for every h ∈ Hi one has
ui(σi∗, σ
−i | h) ≥ v(h), ∀σ−i ∈ Σ−i.
The next result follows from Martin (1975).
Theorem 12. In every zero-sum game with bounded and discrete payoffs, if u1
is Borel measurable then both players have subgame-perfect optimal strategies.
3.2 Constructing some sequences
In this subsection we define for every finite history h ∈ H1 ∪ H2 and every
ordinal ξ, (a) a real number αξ(h), and (b) a set Hξ(h) of plays. The sequence
(αξ(h))ξ will be a non-decreasing sequence of lower bounds to subgame-perfect
0-equilibrium payoff for the player who makes the decision at h, in the game
that start at h. The sequence (Hξ(h))ξ will be a non-increasing (by inclusion)
sequence of sets of histories, such that all plays generated by a subgame-perfect
0-equilibrium at the game that starts at h are included in every set in this
sequence.
Every play p = (at)t∈N ∈ AN defines a sequence (hn)n∈N of finite histories,
where hn = (at)
n
t=1 is the prefix of length n of p.
Suppose that one is given a real-valued function α that is defined over the
set H1 ∪H2 of finite histories.
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Definition 13. Let h be a finite history, and p a play that extends h. The
play p is called α-monotonic at h if the two sequences (α(h2k)){k : hh2k} and
(α(h2k+1)){k : hh2k+1} are non-decreasing.
A play p is called α-viable at a given finite history h if for each player i, the
payoff ui(p) that p yields to player i is higher than α(h′), for every prefix h′ of
p that extends h and that is a decision history for player i. Formally,2
Definition 14. Let α : H1 ∪H2 → R be a real-valued function, and let h be a
finite history. We say that a play p is α-viable at h if
• h is a prefix of p,
• ui(h
′)(p) ≥ α(h′) for every history h′ ∈ H1 ∪H2 that satisfies h  h′ ≺ p.
The following lemma lists two simple properties of the play that is realized
when both players follow subgame-perfect optimal strategies. It follows from
the definitions, and its proof is omitted.
Lemma 15. Fix a finite history h ∈ H1∪H2. Let σ1 and σ2 be subgame-perfect
optimal strategies of the two players in the subgame that starts at h. Then the
realized play p(σ1, σ2) is both α1-monotonic and α1-viable at h.
Set
α1(h) = v
i(h)(h), (12)
H1(h) = {p ∈ A
N : h ≺ p, p is α1-viable at h}. (13)
Thus, α1(h) is the value of the zero-sum subgame that “starts at h” with payoffs
that are the payoffs of player i(h). This is a lower bound on the equilibrium
payoff of player i(h) in this subgame. H1(h) is the set of all plays that yield
both players at least their value in all subgames that may occur after h.
If h = (at)
l
t=1 is a finite history with length l, and a ∈ A, we denote by
(h, a) = (a1, a2, . . . , al, a) the history of length l+1 that starts with h and ends
with a.
For every successor ordinal ξ + 1, define
αξ+1(h) = max
a∈A
min
p∈Hξ(h,a)
ui(h)(p), (14)
Hξ+1(h) =
{
p ∈ ∪a∈AHξ(h, a) : u
i(h)(p) ≥ αξ+1(h)
}
. (15)
If Hξ(h, a) contains all plays that can be generated by subgame-perfect 0-
equilibria in the subgame that starts at (h, a), then in every subgame-perfect
0-equilibrium of the subgame that starts at h player i(h) will receive at least
αξ+1(h). Moreover, after the history h, player i(h) will not play an action that
does not maximize the right-hand side of (14), and therefore Hξ+1(h) contains
all plays that can be generated by subgame-perfect 0-equilibria in the subgame
that starts at h.
2This definition is adapted from Flesch et al. (2008).
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For a limit ordinal ξ define
αξ(h) = max
λ<ξ
αλ(h), (16)
Hξ(h) = {p ∈ A
N : h  p, p is αξ-viable at h}. (17)
The following observation, which follows from the definitions, will be used
later.
Lemma 16. Suppose that p ∈ Hξ(h, a), where a ∈ A achieves the maximum in
the right-hand side of (14). Then p ∈ Hξ+1(h).
3.3 Properties of the sequences (αξ(h))ξ and (Hξ(h))ξ
The following theorem states some properties of the sequences (αξ(h))ξ and
(Hξ(h))ξ, which play a crucial role in the proof of the main result.
Theorem 17. The following holds for every h ∈ H1 ∪H2:
1. The set Hξ(h) is not empty for every ordinal ξ.
2. The sequence (Hξ(h))ξ is monotonic non-increasing (by inclusion).
3. The sequence (αξ(h))ξ is monotonic non-decreasing.
4. For ξ = 1 and for every limit ordinal ξ, there is a play p ∈ Hξ(h) that is
αξ-monotonic at h.
Proof. The proof is by transfinite induction.
Part 1: H1(h) 6= ∅ for every h ∈ H1 ∪H2. Moreover, there is p ∈ H1(h) that is
α1-monotonic at h.
This fact follows from Theorem 12 and Lemma 15: once both players fol-
lows a subgame-perfect optimal strategy, the realized play is α1-viable and α1-
monotonic at h.
Part 2: α2(h) ≥ α1(h) for every h ∈ H1 ∪H2.
Every play in H1(h, a) is α1-viable at (h, a). Therefore α2(h) is the value
of the game where at the second stage player i(h) receives the minimum payoff
generated by an α1-viable plays. But α1(h) is the value of the game where at
the second stage player i(h) receives the minimum payoff generated by a play
which satisfies the α1-viability condition only for histories that are controlled
by player i(h). This implies that indeed α2(h) ≥ α1(h).
Part 3: H2(h) ⊆ H1(h) for every h ∈ H1 ∪H2.
This follows from Part 2 and Eq. (15).
Part 4: If αξ+1(h) ≥ αξ(h) and Hξ+1(h) ⊆ Hξ(h) for every h ∈ H1 ∪H2, then
αξ+2(h) ≥ αξ+1(h) and Hξ+2(h) ⊆ Hξ+1(h) for every h ∈ H1 ∪H2.
This follows from the definitions (14) and (15).
Part 5: For every limit ordinal ξ, every ordinal λ < ξ, and every h ∈ H1 ∪H2,
one has αξ(h) ≥ αλ(h) and Hξ(h) ⊆ Hλ(h).
This follows from the definitions (16) and (17).
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Part 6: For every ordinal ξ and every h ∈ H1∪H2, If Hξ(h) 6= ∅ then Hξ+1(h) 6=
∅.
This follows from the definitions (14) and (15).
Part 7: For every limit ordinal ξ and every h ∈ H1 ∪ H2 one has Hξ(h) 6= ∅.
Moreover, there is a play p ∈ Hξ(h) that is αξ-monotonic at h.
This is the difficult part of the proof. Fix a limit ordinal ξ and a finite
history h. We are going to generate a play that extends h, and we will show
that it is in Hξ(h) and it is αξ-monotonic at h. The play will be generated in
iterations, where the construction in odd iterations differs from the construction
in even iterations. We will then prove that an infinite play is generated after an
even number of iterations. Finally we will prove that it is in Hξ(h) and that it
is αξ-monotonic at h.
Odd iterations:
Let h1 be the history at the beginning of the iterations. For the first iteration,
h1 = h. For all other odd iterations, it is the history generated by the previous
even iteration.
Consider the following algorithm that generates a finite history or a play
that extends h1.
1. Let ξ1 < ξ be a successor ordinal that satisfies αξ(h1) = αξ1(h1). Such an
ordinal exists because every set of ordinals has a minimal element.
2. Let a1 be an action of player i(h1) that achieves the maximum in (14) for
h1 and ξ1.
3. Set h2 = (h1, a1).
4. Let ξ2 ≥ ξ1 − 1 be the minimal ordinal that satisfies αξ(h2) = αξ2(h2).
Note that because ξ is a limit ordinal, ξ2 < ξ.
5. Let a2 be an action of player i(h2) that achieves the maximum in (14) for
h2 and ξ2.
6. Set h3 = (h1, a1, a2).
7. Continue this way to create a sequence (h1, ξ1, a1, h2, ξ2, a2, . . .) that ex-
tends h1. The iteration ends when either ξm = 1 or ξm is a limit ordinal.
If ξm > 1 is a successor ordinal for every m ∈ N, the iteration never ends.
Note that because ξ is a limit ordinal we necessarily have ξm < ξ, for every
m ∈ N.
The next lemma states that odd iterations are finite.
Lemma 18. There is m ∈ N such that either ξm = 1 or ξm is a limit ordinal.
Proof. Assume that the algorithm never terminates: ξm > 1 is a successor
ordinal for every m ∈ N, so that the algorithm generates an infinite sequence
(h1, ξ1, a1, h2, ξ2, a2, . . .).
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We first argue that for every m ∈ N one has
Hξm−1(hm+1) ⊇ Hξm+2−1(hm+3). (18)
Note that because ξm and ξm+2 are successor ordinals, the two ordinals ξm − 1
and ξm+2 − 1 are well defined. Now, let p be any play in Hξm+2−1(hm+3). By
Lemma 16, p ∈ Hξm+2(hm+2). Because ξm+1 − 1 ≤ ξm+2, by the induction
hypothesis (Part 4), p ∈ Hξm+1−1(hm+2). By Lemma 16, p ∈ Hξm+1(hm+1).
Because ξm−1 ≤ ξm+1, by the induction hypothesis (Part 4), p ∈ Hξm−1(hm+1),
as desired.
Because both ξm and ξm+2 are successor ordinals, Eq. (14) implies that for
every m ∈ N
αξm(hm) ≤ αξm+2(hm+2). (19)
Because αξ(hm) = αξm(hm) and αξ(hm+2) = αξm+2(hm+2) we deduce that for
every m ∈ N
αξ(hm) ≤ αξ(hm+2). (20)
Because the payoffs are discrete, the inequality αξ(hm) ≤ αξ(hm+2) can be
strict only finitely many times. That is, there is M ∈ N sufficiently large such
that αξ(hm) = αξ(hm+2) for every m ≥ M . Following the argument that Eq.
(20) holds we deduce that for each such m we have
αξ(hm) = αξm(hm) = αξm+1−1(hm+2) = αξm+2(hm+2) = αξ(hm+2), (21)
so that ξm+2 = ξm+1 − 1. Because this equality holds for every m sufficiently
large, and because there is no infinite decreasing sequence of ordinals, there is
m such that either ξm = 1 or ξm is a limit ordinal, as desired.
Even iterations:
Let h1 be the history that was generated by the previous iterations. Then
it is the output of the previous odd iteration. Denote by λ the last ordinal ξm
generated in the previous odd iteration. Then in particular either λ = 1 or λ is
a limit ordinal, and λ < ξ. Moreover, αξ(h1) = αλ(h1).
By the induction hypothesis (Part 1 or Part 7), there is a play p ∈ Hλ(h1)
that is αλ-monotonic at h1.
By the induction hypothesis (Parts 2, 3 and 4), αξ(h
′) ≥ αλ(h′) for every
prefix h′ of p that extends h1. If αξ(h
′) = αλ(h
′) for every prefix h′ of p
that extends h1, the even iteration is infinite. Otherwise, the output of the
current even iteration is the shortest prefix h′ of p that extends h1 for which
αξ(h
′) > αλ(h
′).
Because p ∈ Hλ(h1), the play p is αλ-viable at h1. Because αξ(h′) = αλ(h′)
for prefixes h′ of p that extend h1, p satisfies the condition of αξ-viability for all
such prefixes.
Lemma 19. Let p∗ be the play that we just generated. Then p∗ is αξ-monotonic
at h.
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Proof. For the part of the play added in odd iterations the monotonicity was
proved in (20). For the part of the play added in even iterations it follows from
the construction.
We are now ready to prove Part 7.
Lemma 20. p∗ ∈ Hξ(h).
Proof. If the number of iterations if finite, so that the last even iteration is
infinite, then the play p∗ is αξ-viable at h. Indeed, by construction it is αξ-
viable at h0, the history at the beginning of the last even iteration. The claim
now follows from Lemma 19.
We now show that it cannot be that the number of iterations is infinite.
Denote by (hn)n∈N all finite prefixes of p∗. Because p∗ is αξ-monotonic at
h, the two sequences (α(h2k))hh2k and (α(h2k+1))hh2k+1 are non-decreasing.
Because the range of the payoffs is finite, these two sequences are eventually
constant. At the beginning of an even iteration we have αξ(h1) = αλ(h1), and
the sequence (αλ(h
′))h′ is non-decreasing in the part of p
∗ that is added in an
even iteration (for the definition of λ, see the construction for even iterations).
But αξ(h
′) ≥ αλ(h′) for every prefix h′ of p∗ that is added in the even iteration,
so that αξ(h
′) = αλ(h
′) for every such h′. In particular, the even iteration does
not end.
By Theorem 17(2) and 17(3) it follows that
Theorem 21. There is an ordinal ξ∗ such that αξ∗(h) = αξ∗+1(h) and Hξ∗(h) =
Hξ∗+1(h) for every h ∈ H
1 ∪H2.
3.4 Proof of Theorem 9
We now construct a pair (σ1∗, σ
2
∗) of strategies, and show that they form a
subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium.
For every finite history h choose an αξ∗ -viable play p(h) that extends h and
that satisfies
u−i(h)(p(h)) = min
p∈Hξ∗ (h)
u−i(h)(p). (22)
If player i deviates, and h is the finite history right after the deviation (so that
i = −i(h)), then p(h) is an αξ∗ -viable play at h that minimizes player’s i’s
payoff.
Let σ1∗ be the following strategy: Follow the play p(∅) as long as player 2
follows p(∅). Suppose that at stage 2k1 player 2 deviates from p(∅). From stage
2k1 + 1 and on follow the play p(h2k1+1) as long as player 2 follows this play.
Suppose that at stage 2k2 player 2 deviates from p(h2k1+1). From stage 2k2+1
and on follow the play p(h2k2+1) as long as player 2 follows this play. Continue
this way.
The strategy σ2∗ of player 2 is defined symmetrically.
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We now show that (σ1∗ , σ
2
∗) is a subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium. To this end
we fix a finite history h ∈ H1 and we show that
u2(σ1∗ , σ
2 | h) ≤ u2(σ1∗ , σ
2
∗ | h), ∀σ
2 ∈ Σ2.
One can use similar argument to show that the analog inequality for player 1
holds as well, so that (σ1∗ , σ
2
∗) is indeed a subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium.
Let σ2 ∈ Σ2 be any strategy of player 2. Let p∗ = p(σ1∗ , σ
2
∗ | h) be the play
induced by (σ1∗ , σ
2
∗) given h. This is the play that is generated if player 2 does
not deviate. Let p = p(σ1∗ , σ
2 | h) be the play when player 2 deviates to σ2.
Denote by 2k1, 2k2, . . . the stages where σ
2 and σ2∗ differ along p; in those
stages player 1 observes the deviations of player 2. The sequence (2kj)j may be
finite or infinite. Denote by pj = p(σ
1
∗, σ
2) the play that player 1 start to follow
at stage 2kj , for each j.
We complete the proof by showing that
u2(p) ≤ u2(p∗). (23)
It is sufficient to show that
u2(pj) ≤ u
2(p∗), ∀j. (24)
If σ2 and σ2∗ differ only finitely many times along p, Eq. (23) follows from
Eq. (24). If σ2 and σ2∗ differ infinitely many times along p, then the sequence
(pj)j∈N converges to p, so that Eq. (23) follows from Eq. (24) and the lower-
semi-continuity of u2. This is the only place in the proof where the lower-semi-
continuity of the payoff functions is used.
The proof of (24) is by induction on j. Because p∗ is αξ∗ -viable at h, u
2(p1) =
αξ∗(h2k1) ≤ u
2(p∗). For every j ≥ 1, because pj is αξ∗ -viable at h2kj , u
2(pj+1) =
αξ∗(h2kj ) ≤ u
2(pj), which is at most u
2(p∗) by the induction hypothesis. The
proof is now complete.
3.5 A Folk Theorem
Our construction enables us to characterize the set of plays that can arise in a
subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium in the game with discrete payoffs.
Theorem 22. A play p is induced by some subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium if and
only if p is αξ∗-viable.
Proof. If p is αξ∗ -viable, then the construction in Section 3.4 shows that it is
the play that is induced by some subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium.
To see that the converse is true, we show that if (σ1∗ , σ
2
∗) is a subgame-perfect
0-equilibrium, then p(σ1∗ , σ
2
∗ | h) is αξ-viable at h, for every ordinal ξ and every
finite history h.
Because α1(h) is the value of the subgame that starts at h, and because every
subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium is an equilibrium in the subgame that starts at
h, the claim follows for ξ = 1.
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Suppose now that the claim holds for an ordinal ξ. Let h be any finite
history. Because the claim holds for ξ, the play p(σ1∗ , σ
2
∗ | h) is αξ-viable at
(h, a) for every a, and therefore in any subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium of the
subgame that starts at h, the payoff to player i(h) is at least αξ+1(h). This
implies that p(σ1∗ , σ
2
∗ | h) is αξ+1-viable at h, for every h.
Finally, the definition of αξ for limit ordinals ξ implies that if p(σ
1
∗, σ
2
∗ | h)
is αλ-viable at h for every ordinal λ < ξ, then it is also αξ-viable at h.
4 Comments
4.1 Chance moves
Borel games are deterministic, and the sequence of actions chosen by the players
uniquely determines the outcome. In many situations there are chance moves
along the game, where actions are chosen according to a known probability
distribution. This situation is equivalent to the case where there is a third
player who follows a specific non-deterministic strategy, whatever the other
players play. Our proof can be adapted to this more general situation, and this
will be done elsewhere.
4.2 Positive recursive Borel games
Recursive Borel games are games where some finite histories are terminating, in
the sense that once they occur the payoff is determined (and the play that follows
them does not affect the players’ payoffs), and the payoff of every infinite (non-
terminating) play is 0. Many positional games that are studied in the computer
science literature have this form. The significance of this class of games to game
theory was exhibited in the context of stochastic games by Vieille (2000), who
used it as a step to proving the existence of an equilibrium payoff in every two-
player stochastic game. A recursive Borel game is called positive if both u1 and
u2 are positive functions.
Flesch et al. (2008) studied positive recursive Borel game with finitely many
states; these are positional games that are played on a finite directed graph,
where each vertex is controlled by some player, and when the game reaches
some vertex, the controlling player can choose whether to terminate the game,
or whether to continue the game by choosing one of the edges that leaves the
vertex. The terminal payoff depends only on the vertex where termination
occurred, and not on the whole past play.
Flesch et al. (2008) prove that every such game admits a subgame-perfect 0-
equilibrium.3 In their proof, they define for every vertex s a sequence (αk(s))k∈N
that is similar to our sequence (αξ(h))ξ, they prove that this sequence is non-
decreasing, and, because there are finitely many vertices, they deduce that there
is k∗ ∈ N such that αk∗+1(s) = αk∗(s) for every vertex s. They then use a
3When transitions are random, Flesch et al. (2008) prove the existence of a subgame-
perfect ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0.
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similar construction of the subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium as the one that we
used.
In Borel games every history is a different vertex. Therefore one needs to
employ a much more delicate construction, that differs from the one in Flesch
et al. (2008) in two respects. First, when the number of vertices is infinite,
there need not by k∗ ∈ N such that αk∗+1(s) = αk∗(s) for every vertex s, and
therefore (αξ(h))ξ should be defined for every ordinal. Second, one also needs
to take into account the possible plays, and introduce the sets (Hξ(h))ξ. In fact,
this paper grew from an attempt to understand why the proof in Flesch et al.
(2008) fails for positive recursive games with infinitely many vertices.
It turns out that for positive recursive Borel games the construction can
be simplified, and a single odd iteration is sufficient to show that Hξ(h) is not
empty for limit ordinals ξ.
4.3 Borel games with general payoffs
Example 3 in Solan and Vieille (2003) shows that without the condition that pay-
offs are lower-semi-continuous, a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium need not exist.
However, Solan and Vieille (2003) show that a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium
does exist if one allows behavior strategies. The existence of a subgame-perfect
ε-equilibrium in behavior strategies was proved in other setups where the payoff
functions are not lower-semi-continuous, see, e.g., Solan (2005) and Mashiah-
Yaakovi (2008).
In our proof the lower-semi-continuity of the payoff functions was used only
in the last part, to show that any deviation σ2 that differs from σ2∗ infinitely
many times cannot be profitable, as soon as any deviation σ2 that differs from
σ2∗ finitely many times is not profitable. We do not know how the proof should
be adapted to handle general payoff functions.
In fact, the following example shows that our definition of αξ and Hξ is not
appropriate for general Borel games. Consider a Borel game with A = {a, b}.
The payoff functions of the two players are as follows:
Condition u1(h) u2(h)
Both players played b finitely many times 2 2
Only player 1 played b finitely many times 2 1
Only player 2 played b finitely many times 1 2
No player played b finitely many times 0 0
Note that u1 and u2 are not lower-semi-continuous. Playing b finitely many
times is a dominant strategy for both players, so that the unique subgame-
perfect 0-equilibrium payoff is (2, 2). However, one can verify that αξ(h) = 1
for every finite history h and every ordinal ξ, so that the folk theorem, Theorem
22, does not hold, and our construction of the subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium in
the proof of Theorem 12 is invalid.
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